Compensation of Public Employees Disclosable to Union Official Under Freedom of Information Law by Glass, Maureen A.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 54 
Number 4 Volume 54, Summer 1980, Number 4 Article 10 
July 2012 
Compensation of Public Employees Disclosable to Union Official 
Under Freedom of Information Law 
Maureen A. Glass 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Glass, Maureen A. (1980) "Compensation of Public Employees Disclosable to Union Official Under 
Freedom of Information Law," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 54 : No. 4 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol54/iss4/10 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
entry was not an issue to be proved by the prosecution or rebutted
by the defendant,"" it seems that the refusal to require the disclo-
sure of such information was clearly within the trial court's
discretion.""
Notwithstanding that, in light of its definitive interpretation
of the burglary statute, the Court's finding that no abuse of discre-
tion occurred appears sound, it is submitted that the Mackey
Court erred in failing to promulgate guidelines to which the lower
courts could refer in exercising such discretion in the future. In-
deed, the majority's acknowledgment that the denial of the defen-
dant's motion may have been erroneous had it "demanded the ba-
sis upon which the People would contend that he intended to
commit a crime," ' 5 suggests that the Court has implicitly sanc-
tioned the practice of penalizing a defendant who asks the wrong
question. Clearly, in the wake of Iannone and Fitzgerald, which
placed the onus on the defendant to seek clarification of a deficient
indictment by requesting a bill of particulars, the Court's failure to
require that such requests be liberally construed increases the pos-
sibility that a defendant may be unfairly surprised at trial and
consequently rendered incapable of rebutting the prosecution's
evidence."3 "
Richard V. Silver
PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW
Compensation of public employees disclosable to union official
under Freedom of Information Law
New York's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)' was en-
acted to ensure public access to all records generated and compiled
by state governmental agencies. 38 Specifically exempted from
... See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
34 See generally People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 597-98, 384 N.E.2d 656, 662, 412
N.Y.S.2d 110, 115-16 (1978); People v. Rubin, 170 Misc. 969, 971, 11 N.Y.S.2d 405, 407-08
(N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1939).
135 49 N.Y.2d at 280, 401 N.E.2d at 402, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 291 (citation omitted).
... See note 111 and accompanying text supra.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
"' Fink v. Lefkowitz, 47 N.Y.2d 567, 571, 393 N.E.2d 463, 465, 419 N.Y.S.2d 467, 470
(1979); Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59 App. Div. 2d 309, 311, 399 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535
(4th Dep't 1977), afld, 45 N.Y.2d 954, 383 N.E.2d 1151, 411 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1978);
D'Allessandro v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 56 App. Div. 2d 762, 763, 392 N.Y.S.2d
433, 435 (1st Dep't 1977). See also Baumgarten v. Koch, 97 Misc. 2d 449, 450-51, 411
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FOIL's disclosure requirement, however, is any material that "if
disclosed would impair present or imminent . . . collective bar-
gaining negotiations. '" 139 Recently, in Doolan v. BOCES, 40 the
Court of Appeals strictly construed the collective bargaining ex-
emption, ordering disclosure to a union official of salaries and
fringe benefits of public employees, despite their apparent useful-
ness in labor negotiations.14 1
Doolan, the president-elect of a statewide school administra-
tors' union,142 sought disclosure of an annual report detailing sal-
ary and fringe benefit data for teachers and administrators in one
Suffolk County school district. 4 ' The custodian of the study, the
Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES), denied ac-
cess on the ground that it was prepared as a service to member
school districts and distributed only on a subscription basis.144 The
Supreme Court, Suffolk County, ordered the release of the report
to Doolan," 5 concluding that it was a "factual tabulation" subject
to disclosure under FOIL.1 46 The Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, reversed, however, finding that the study was strictly a
service performed by BOCES for its subscribers and therefore not
N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Marino, The New York Freedom of Infor-
mation Law, 43 FORDHAM L. Rav. 83, 83 (1974). Section 87 of the new Freedom of Informa-
tion Law was enacted in 1977 as a broad disclosure provision aimed at promoting a more
open government and greater public participation in the decisionmaking process. See Mira-
cle Mile Assocs. v. Yudelson, 68 App. Div. 2d 176, 181, 417 N.Y.S.2d 142, 146 (4th Dep't),
appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 706, 397 N.E.2d 758, 422 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1979); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 84 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). See generally Marino, supra. For a discussion of the
Federal Freedom of Information Act upon which the New York statute was modeled, see
Karst, "The Files". Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal
Data, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 342 (1966).
139 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Other records ex-
empted from disclosure under the statute include: (1) Those records specifically exempted
under state or federal law; (2) records which if disclosed would constitute an invasion of
privacy; (3) trade secrets; (4) records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (5) records
which if disclosed would endanger human life or safety; and (6) examination questions and
answers. Id. § 87(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
140 48 N.Y.2d 341, 398 N.E.2d 533, 422 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1979), rev'g, 64 App. Div. 2d 702,
407 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't 1978).
141 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
142 Id. at 344, 398 N.E.2d at 535, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
I' Id. at 343-44, 398 N.E.2d at 534-35, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 929. Doolan commenced this
article 78 proceeding when BOCES denied his request for the salary data. Id. at 344, 398
N.E.2d at 535, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
144 Id.
24 Id.
14 Id.
1980]
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a disclosable "report" within the directives of the statute. 14 7
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed, 148 holding, in-
ter alia, that compensation data of public employees could not be
protected from disclosure by the common-law "governmental in-
terest" privilege.'4 In an opinion authored by Judge Meyer, 50 the
Doolan majority dismissed BOCES contention that by disclosing
the report at a nominal transcript fee, the court effectively would
undermine the cost-allocation provisions of the Education Law.' 51
147 64 App. Div. 2d at 703, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 539. The supreme court correctly applied
FOIL's predecessor statute, see Ch. 578, § 2, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1538-42 (as amended by Ch.
579, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1542-43), the effective law at the time of its decision. Former
section 88 was superceded by the present statute six months prior to the appellate division's
determination. Yet, the appellate division decided the case in accordance with the repealed
law, which contained no collective bargaining exception. See 64 App. Div. 2d at 703, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 539.
148 48 N.Y.2d 341, 398 N.E.2d 533, 422 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1979). The Court of Appeals de-
termined that the new FOIL rather than former section 88 applied in Doolan, but concluded
that the statutory changes did not require a different result under the facts of the case. Id.
at 344 n.1, 398 N.E.2d at 535 n.1, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 930 n.1 (citing Demisay, Inc. v. Petite, 31
N.Y.2d 896, 292 N.E.2d 674, 340 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1972)). Compare Delaney v. Del Bello, 62
App. Div. 2d 281, 405 N.Y.S.2d 276 (2d Dep't 1978) and Baumgarten v. Koch, 97 Misc. 2d
449, 450 n.2, 411 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488-89 n.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) with McAulay v.
Board of Educ., 61 App. Div. 2d 1048, 403 N.Y.S.2d 116 (2d Dep't 1978), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d
659, 396 N.E.2d 1033, 421 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1979).
2149 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931; see note 156 infra.
150 Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Gabrielli, Wachtler and Fuchsberg concurred in the
majority opinion. Judges Jasen and Jones dissented.
151 48 N.Y.2d at 346, 398 N.E.2d at 536, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. New York's Education
Law, N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 1950(1), 1951(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980), provides that local
school districts may jointly establish a cooperative board for the purpose of sharing the
benefits and costs of administering educational services. Id. § 1950(1). While FOIL requires
payment of, or an offer to pay the prescribed statutory fee of "twenty-five cents per photo-
copy ... or the actual cost of reproducing," N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 87(1)(b)(iii), 89(3) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1979-1980), the statute contains no cost-allocation requirement. BOCES,
therefore, suggested that a conflict with the cost-allocation policy of the Education Law
would arise if the plaintiff was permitted access to a BOCES service at the nominal cost
prescribed by FOIL. The Court reasoned, however, that while the potential for statutory
conflict existed, it was not an issue in the case since cost allocation applies only to school
districts. 48 N.Y.2d at 346, 398 N.E.2d at 536, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. The Court further sug-
gested that any such statutory conflict should be resolved by the legislature. Id.
Additional grounds advanced by BOCES to support nondisclosure included a claim that
the salary report was not "final agency policy" subject to disclosure under section
87(2)(g)(iii) of the statute and that disclosure was contrary to article VIII, § 1 of the state
constitution, which provides that "[n]o ... school district shall give or loan any money or
property to or in aid of any individual, or private corporation or association," N.Y. CONST.,
art. VIII, § 1. 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. Addressing the first
of these arguments, the Court held that the "final agency policy" exception did not include
agency material comprised of "statistical or factual tabulations." Id. at 345-46, 398 N.E.2d
at 536, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 930-31 (quoting N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(g)(i) (McKinney Supp.
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Noting that the burden of proving an exemption from FOIL's dis-
closure requirements is on the agency resisting disclosure,152 the
Court determined that BOCES bare assertion that the requested
data was within the collective bargaining exemption was insuffi-
cient to meet that burden. 53 Since the more analytical portion of
the report dealing with "negotiating developments" was not re-
quested,1 ' the purely factual compilation of compensation data
was within FOIL's disclosure requirements.1 55 Finally, the majority
concluded, the common-law "governmental interest" privilege
could not constitute a bar since disclosure was mandated by the
statute." 6 Two dissenting judges of the Court of Appeals voted to
1979-1980)). The Court also rejected BOCES constitutional argument, reasoning that access
to government records at the statutory cost of copying did not constitute a gift or waste of
public funds. To conclude otherwise, the Court asserted, would effectively limit access to
agency records "except on a cost-accounting basis." Id. at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 931.
'52 See Miracle Mile Assocs. v. Yudelson, 68 App. Div. 2d 176, 179, 417 N.Y.S.2d 142,
145 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 706, 397 N.E.2d 758, 422 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1979).
Because FOIL was intended by the legislature to advance the principles of a free society, see
note 138 supra, its disclosure mandate is construed broadly while the exclusion provisions
are interpreted narrowly. Zuckerman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 53 App. Div. 2d 405,
407-08, 385 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (3d Dep't 1976). Accordingly, the agency claiming nondisclo-
sure must prove that disclosure would jeopardize the public interest. In Fink v. Lefkowitz,
47 N.Y.2d 567, 393 N.E.2d 463, 419 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1979), the Court of Appeals determined
that a resisting agency is required to articulate particularized and specific justifications for
exemption and, if necessary, submit the requested materials to an in camera inspection. Id.
at 571, 393 N.E.2d at 465, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 470; see Church of Scientology v. State, 46
N.Y.2d at 906, 907, 387 N.E.2d 1216, 1216, 414 N.Y.S.2d 900, 901 (1979); cf. Dunlea v. Gold-
mark, 54 App. Div. 2d 446, 449, 389 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (3d Dep't 1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 754,
372 N.E.2d 798, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (1977) (budget examiner's file partially exempt under
former law only upon detailed proof). As a practical matter, however, in camera inspection
rarely will be necessary since a description of the material and its intended purpose is usu-
ally sufficient. See Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 119, 316 N.E.2d 301, 304, 359
N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1974). But cf. Walker v. City of New York, 90 Misc. 2d 565, 394 N.Y.S.2d 797
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977), rev'd in part, 64 App. Div. 2d 980, 408 N.Y.S.2d 811 (2d
Dep't 1978) (lower court order for disclosure of all prior complaints against police officer
reversed and remanded for in camera review as to whether disclosure would reveal confiden-
tial information regarding criminal investigation).
153 48 N.Y.2d at 346-47, 398 N.E.2d at 536, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
' Id.
155 Id.; cf. Pooler v. Nyquist, 89 Misc. 2d 705, 706, 392 N.Y.S.2d 948, 951 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1976) (statistical data generally discoverable under former section 88).
256 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. Under the common-law
privilege for confidential governmental records, a public agency could avoid disclosure if it
satisfied the court that nondisclosure served the public interest. See Cirale v. 80 Pine St.
Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113, 117, 316 N.E.2d 301, 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1974); W. RIcHADSON,
EVIDENCE § 456 (Prince 10th ed. 1973); 8 J. WIGMORE § 2378 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). In
Cirale, the Court of Appeals stated: "The hallmark of this privilege is that it is applicable
19801
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affirm the appellate division determination, however, and adhered
to that court's rationale.15
Doolan is the first Court of Appeals decision to define the
scope of FOIL's collective bargaining exemption since the enact-
ment of the statute in 1977.158 By excluding objective compensa-
tion data from its coverage, the Court appears to have struck a
balance between the integrity of the collective bargaining process
and the traditional rule permitting access to payroll data of public
employees. 159 Moreover, in holding that BOCES had failed to meet
its statutory burden of proving "present or imminent" impairment
of collective bargaining, Doolan ensures that a resisting agency will
be unable to avoid disclosure by making conclusory allegations
that an exemptive provision applies or merely suggesting that fu-
ture labor negotiations are inevitable.
Perhaps more significantly, the Doolan Court has clarified the
role of the common-law "governmental interest" privilege in light
of the comprehensive disclosure required by FOIL. Under the com-
mon-law privilege, confidential government records were shielded
from public disclosure where nondisclosure tended to serve the
public interest.1 60 The Court reasoned, however, that all public pol-
icy regarding disclosure of governmental records has been embod-
when the public interest would be harmed if the material were to lose its cloak of confidenti-
ality." 35 N.Y.2d at 117, 316 N.E.2d at 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 4; see People v. Keating, 286
App. Div. 150, 153, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565 (1st Dep't 1955). See generally Marino, supra
note 138.
157 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 932 (Jasen, J., and Jones, J.,
dissenting); see note 147 and accompanying text supra.
158 Previously, in Trauernicht v. BOCES, 95 Misc. 2d 394, 394-95, 407 N.Y.S.2d 398,
398-99 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), the Supreme Court, Nassau County, considered a
similar request by the executive director of a school administrators' union for disclosure of
an employee salary report. The Trauernicht court denied access under the collective bar-
gaining exemption, however, reasoning that "disclosure would only serve an inequitable one-
sided negotiating ploy," rather than the informational purposes for which FOIL was in-
tended. Id. at 396, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 399. Further, the court recognized that disclosure would
cause "irreparable harm" to the cost-allocation system created by the Education Law. Id.;
cf. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Helsby, 84 Misc. 2d 17, 19, 374 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1975) (names of employees who support rival union may not be disclosed to
incumbent union). See also NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 201 F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1953).
159 See Miller v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 81 Misc. 2d 81, 82, 365 N.Y.S.2d 444,
445 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975), af'd, 51 App. Div. 2d 765, 379 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't
1976); Marino, supra note 138, at 87-88 & n.31; cf. Gannett Co. v. County of Monroe, 59
App. Div. 2d 309, 311-12, 399 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535-36 (4th Dep't 1977), a/I'd, 45 N.Y.2d 954,
383 N.E.2d 1151, 411 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1978) (names, job titles and salaries disclosable under
former law).
160 See note 156 supra.
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ied in the statute.'61 Since government statistics are specifically ac-
cessible under FOIL,"6 2 common-law policy arguments will no
longer support nondisclosure of any material which the statute re-
quires to be disclosed. In short, the common-law public interest
privilege has been subordinated to FOIL. It appears, therefore,
that Doolan will encourage strict compliance with FOIL's directive
for disclosure of statistical data.
Maureen A. Glass
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-207: Existence of agreement to arbitrate may be
implied from evidence of prior course of dealing or trade usage
Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) pro-
vides in part that additional terms contained in a written confir-
mation will become part of a contract between merchants unless,
among other things, the additional terms materially alter the con-
tract.6 Previously, in New York, it had been held that an arbitra-
tion clause contained in an acceptance or confirmation is a mate-
rial variance of the terms of a prior offer or agreement and thus
not part of the contract in the absence of express agreement
thereto by the parties. 4 Recently, in Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Sny-
161 48 N.Y.2d at 347, 398 N.E.2d at 537, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 931. The Court stated: "The
public policy concerning governmental disclosure is fixed by the Freedom of Information
Law; the common-law interest privilege cannot protect from disclosure materials which that
law requires to be disclosed." Id.
162 See N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(g)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
163 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-207 & Official Comment 2 (McKinney 1964).
16 Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 327, 333, 380 N.E.2d 239,
242, 408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 (1978). The decision in Marlene resolved a split that previously
had existed in New York as to whether an arbitration clause contained in an acceptance
constituted a material alteration of a contract. Although there was some lower court prece-
dent foreshadowing the Court of Appeals' holding in Marlene, see, e.g., Doughboy Indus.
Inc. v. Pantasote Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 223, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 495-96 (1st Dep't 1962),
neither the Code nor the comments of its draftsmen suggested that an arbitration clause is a
material alteration within the meaning of § 2-207. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-207 & Official Com-
ments 3-4 (McKinney 1964). Moreover, other New York courts had indicated that they
might take judicial notice that arbitration is a common practice in the textile industry, see,
e.g., Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Armtex, Inc., 53 App. Div. 2d 582, 582, 384 N.Y.S.2d 837,
838 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.); Loudon Mfg., Inc. v. American & Efird Mills, Inc., 46 App. Div.
2d 637, 638, 360 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (1st Dep't 1974) (per curiam), and at least one court
concluded that in such industries an arbitration provision is not a material alteration within
the meaning of § 2-207(2)(b) of the Code. See Gaynor-Stafford Indus., Inc. v. Mafco Tex-
tured Fibers, 52 App. Div. 2d 481, 485, 384 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791 (1st Dep't 1976).
In addition, prior to Marlene, some New York courts had attempted to validate arbitra-
1980]
